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Responsibility for Implicit Bias1 
 
Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed 
that implicit biases are pervasive. Implicit biases are typically characterised as 
automatic associations, of which we may not be aware, that are difficult to control, 
and may conflict with our professed beliefs and values.2 Whilst implicit processes are 
pervasive, unavoidable and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead 
us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target 
social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. 
Despite intentions to the contrary, these biases can influence our behaviours and 
judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. Here is a 
paradigmatic example in which implicit biases influence behaviour and judgment: 
 
Professor P is engaged in anti-racist and feminist activities. She explicitly 
avows egalitarian values and strives for fair treatment. She believes her 
students deserve to be treated with equal consideration, and hasn¶t reflected 
much on her behaviour, since it seems to her there is no reason for concern. 
Accordingly, she believes that she adheres to her egalitarian goals, which is 
what she wants and endorses. 
However, Professor P harbours implicit biases of the sort found by empirical 
psychology: associations between whites and intellect (Amodio & Devine 
2006), and negative evaluative associations with black people (Olson & Fazio 
2006). These implicit cognitions influence her behaviour towards her students 
± again, in ways we might predict given the findings of empirical psychology: 
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 Not all parties to the debate accept this characterisation. See e.g. Mandlebaum 2014, Levy 2015 for 
the claim that implicit biases likely have propositional structure.  
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her evaluations of the equally good work of black students is slightly less 
glowing than that of white students (Wood et al 2009); her interactions with 
black students are beset by micro-behaviours that indicate greater tension and 
discomfort, and as a result she is marginally less warm and less patient with 
them than with her white students (Dovidio et al 2002).  
Professor P is not unique ± but wholly typical; her colleagues show a similar 
pattern of evaluations and behavioural interactions, which subtly discriminate 
against black students. The cumulative effects of this are manifest: fewer 
black students occupy the top percentiles of classes in her department, fewer 
pursue or are encouraged to pursue further study in her subject, the student 
body in her discipline, at the levels at which it is selected for, are 
disproportionately white. 
 
In this scenario, implicit biases are complicit in racially discriminatory behaviour, 
both in individual interactions, and as part of a pattern of behaviours that contribute, 
alongside other exclusionary factors, to sustaining the under-representation of black 
students in higher education. Note that higher education is not unique; similar 
scenarios may be found in many domains of education and employment. Implicit 
racial biases have been found in studies that examine biases in healthcare contexts 
(Green et al 2007), housing (Turner 2007; Kang 2014), the criminal justice system 
(Eberhardt et al 2004), financial decisions (Tetlock et al 2000, see Madva 2016a for 
instructive discussion), and in everyday interpersonal interactions (Dovidio et al 
2002). Moreover, other implicit biases target gender, sexuality, age or disability 
(Valian 1999, Cooley et al 2014, Levy & Banaji 2002; Wilson & Scior 2014). It is 
very likely that any one individual harbours and is influenced by some sort of implicit 
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bias; the findings mean that we cannot rule out that, for each of us, we are influenced 
in our judgements or behaviours in discriminatory ways.3 
 Such patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in 
remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for 
implicit bias. Yet, unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, discriminatory 
behaviour resulting from implicit bias is often unintentional, unendorsed, perpetrated 
without awareness; and the harms may be particularly damaging because they are 
cumulative and collectively perpetrated. Similarly, the cognitions involved in the 
biases are ones from which agents may be alienated, since they conflict with endorsed 
values; the agent may not be aware of their presence in her cognition; nor aware of 
their role in behaviour. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility, for the 
cognitions themselves, or for actions influenced by them? In this article, we outline 
some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought which address questions of 
responsibility for implicit bias. Our main focus, in keeping with much of the 
literature, is on responsibility for actions influenced by such biases. These debates 
have import both for how we think about and respond to implicit bias; and for our 
understandings of responsibility. We focus on 1) the kind of responsibility at issue; 2) 
revisionist vs non-revisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; 
3) individual, institutional and collective responsibility for implicit bias. We close 
with a practical example, of institutional responsibility and implicit bias training, that 
animates some of these issues.  
 
1) What sense of responsibility? 
                                                 
3
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In remedying wrongs, we might be interested both in causal responsibility and moral 
responsibility; that is, we want to know both who or what brought about the wrong, 
and who is to blame for it. Notably, some have argued that attention to individuals 
and their implicit biases is inapt in addressing these patterns of discrimination, since 
the causal responsibility for such inequalities and discriminatory patterns is 
fundamentally structural (Haslanger 2015, Anderson 2012). Accordingly, remedies 
would do better to target these fundamental, structural causes.  
 On the other hand, others have maintained that implicit biases, and crucially, 
actions that manifest them, are causally responsible for some of these harms and 
inequalities (Saul 2013a) ± and, attention should be paid to understanding the role of 
implicit bias in sustaining these harms and attempting to mitigate their influence.  
 However, in drawing attention to the role of implicit biases in sustaining 
harms and exclusion, it has been contentious whether individuals are always morally 
responsible for these harms. Saul has suggested not, writing that we should  
 
abandon the view that all biases against stigmatised groups are 
blameworthy « [because a] person should not be blamed for an implicit bias 
that they are completely unaware of, which results solely from the fact that 
they live in a sexist culture. (2013a: 55, emphasis in original) 
 
Here, Saul focuses on whether individuals are responsible merely for having implicit 
biases. However, this question is distinct from the question of whether one is 
responsible for manifesting implicit bias in one¶s actions, and one may be 
blameworthy for one¶s actions even if one is not blameworthy for the presence of the 
implicit association in one¶s cognitive make up (Holroyd, 2012). In any case, Saul 
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suggests that once individuals are aware that they have, and may be influenced by, 
implicit biases, they are responsible for doing something about it: 
 
They may, however, be blamed if they fail to act properly on the knowledge 
that they are likely to be biased²e.g., by investigating and implementing 
remedies to deal with their biases (ibid.) 
 
Saul¶s remarks here exemplify both the backward looking concern with appraising 
individuals for their cognitions and behaviours; and attention to the forward-looking 
issues concerned with taking responsibility for correcting harms and mitigating costs 
(of course, failure to meet these forward-looking obligations may render one 
blameworthy, in the backward looking sense, for that failure). In the wider debate, 
theorists have teased apart the forward-looking and backward-looking concerns into 
(inter alia) the following different questions, each of which might legitimately be 
regarded as concerning a sense in which the agent is responsible: 
 
i) does the attitude or act reflect badly (or well) on the agent; is there are 
fault (or indeed credit) that can be attributed to her?  
ii) should the agent be regarded as blameworthy for the fault she has, or 
has demonstrated in her action; should she bear some cost or burden 
(in the form of sanction, or blame) for this?  
These two questions are backward looking, and contrast with a third concern, namely,  
iii) what forward looking obligations do individuals have for dealing with 
the fault, or problematic behaviour?  
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Those familiar with the responsibility literature will be aware that the two backward-
looking concerns, above, have sometimes been characterised as questions of 
attributability (i) and accountability (ii) (cf. Watson, 1996, Smith 2012). However, 
these two terms have (confusingly) garnered somewhat different usage in the 
literature on responsibility for implicit bias. Zheng has labelled the backward looking 
senses (i and ii) as together questions of attributability; and characterised as 
accountability the forward looking issue of how remedial obligations are distributed 
(this way of using the two notions, Zheng notes, has more in common with the way 
Scanlon uses the terms).  
 All three questions are activated in thinking about responsibility for implicit 
bias. To avoid terminological confusion, in the following discussion, we make 
reference to the particular question at issue: does it reflect on the agent; is she 
blameworthy for it (the backward-looking questions); do obligations to address bias 
attach to an agent (the forward-looking concerns)? 
 Zheng argues that we arrive at different senses of responsibility via different 
routes. The backward-looking questions concern what reflects well or badly on the 
agent, such that they are subject to µappraisive responses¶ such as praise or blame (or 
perhaps other evaluations of character). Blameworthiness, thus construed, is a 
backward looking matter. For example, to find Professor P responsible in this sense 
would be to suppose that her discriminatory evaluations and behaviours flow from the 
relevant features of her agency ± some metaphysical or psychological facts ± which 
allow those actions to reflect on her as an agent, and enable us to perhaps find her 
blameworthy for those harmful acts she perpetrates. 
 In contrast, the forward-looking concerns (what Zheng calls accountability) 
track not deep facts about the agent and what reflects on her, but rather social facts 
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about the distribution of benefits and burdens when something has gone wrong: who 
should step in to deal with the costs of wrongdoing, irrespective of whether they were 
at fault. We might hold Professor P to be charged with acting to remedy the costs of 
the harms she is implicated in, irrespective of whether we think those harms are ones 
that reflect on her, or for which she is blameworthy. 
 In some cases of implicit bias, it may be clear that  the biases warrant 
backward-looking, appraisive responses: for example, in cases where the agent has 
cultivated the biases, this would reflect badly on her, and she may be blameworthy for 
her biases. Likewise, in cases in which the agent endorses or would endorse the 
discriminatory behaviour (Zheng 2016, Holroyd 2016), the behaviour appears to 
reflect a fault on her part; moreover judgements of blame and expressions of blame ± 
may also be engaged.  
 However, in other cases ± which meet the paradigm illustrated by Professor P 
± things may not be so clear. Various authors have suggested that there are reasons for 
which the discriminatory behaviour may not reflect badly on the agent, and certainly 
not in a way that warrants blame (see e.g. Saul 2013a, quoted above; Levy 2012, 2014 
and section 2 below), since the behaviour is not something the agent is aware of, nor 
under the agent¶s control. On the other hand, Brownstein sets out the case for taking 
actions that express implicit bias to be reflective of who the agent is, insofar as they 
reflect the agent¶s cares (which may not form a coherent set, and hence may conflict 
with her other cares). What the agent cares about, Brownstein suggests, is reflected in 
multitrack patterns of behaviour that reveal the agent¶s dispositions (2015: 12). As 
such actions that express implicit bias can be attributable to the agent, and may 
ground moral appraisals of her. 
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In any case, one might hold such agents responsible in the in the sense of 
having forward looking obligations to deal with the problem, irrespective of whether 
bias, or actions influenced by it, reflects badly on them, or is something for which 
they can be blamed (Zheng 2016). Withholding backward-looking appraisive 
judgements and maintaining that the agent is responsible only in the forward-looking 
sense of having remedial obligations may seem appealing for three reasons. First, one 
may have doubts about appraising an agent, yet insist that it is important that someone 
is held responsible nonetheless (though see Holroyd 2012, Brownstein 2015, and the 
discussion in section 2 below, for arguments addressing different versions of such 
doubts). As Zheng puts it, it is important that we are held to forward-looking 
responsibilities µbecause it is appropriate for us to clean up after our own actions 
when a mess has been made¶, even if the mess doesn¶t reflect badly on us, or warrant 
blame (2016: 74). When someone has been harmed by implicit bias, she is owed 
µcompensation, apology, and redress¶ irrespective of whether anyone is found to be at 
fault or blameworthy (2016: 74). (Note that it remains for proponents of this strategy 
to delineate senses of apology and redress that can play this function, whilst being 
distinct from those appraisive responses characteristic of backward-looking 
responsibility judgements.) Second, it may be difficult to identify, with sufficient 
certainty to warrant blame, whether implicit bias has played a role in discriminatory 
behaviour in any isolated case. 
 A third reason for focusing on responsibility in the forward-looking sense 
concerns worries about the engagement of the appraisive responses. Saul worries that 
blame might produce backlash or hostility. This is a common concern: Zheng (80) 
marshals evidence (Legault et al 2011) which suggests that high threat confrontations 
can produce defensiveness and greater bias (implicit and explicit); Vargas (2017) 
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raises worries about securing the needed buy-in for norms against bias, if agents 
experience backlash in response to blame that is not accepted or well-received.  
 The appeal of a focus on holding people responsible in the exclusively 
forward-looking sense, for actions influenced by implicit bias, rests on a) the extent to 
which we are convinced that agents are not (or cannot be identified as) responsible in 
the backward-looking senses (more on this in section 2 below); and b) the plausibility 
of concerns about negative responses to appraisive evaluations such as blame.  
 On this latter point, it is worth noting that appraisive responses may include a 
wide range of moral evaluations that need not be characterised by µhigh threat¶ 
features (such as high emotion, or challenge to the agent¶s self-conception or esteem). 
For a start, appraisals that focus on whether biases reflect badly on the agent (sense (i) 
above) may not involve blame at all. Rather, they might invoke an evaluative 
judgement about the agent and her character - she is cruel, or she is racist - without 
taking a stance on whether this is her fault. This is the sort of µaretic appraisal¶ 
(Watson 1996) that has been taken to be distinct from judgements of 
blameworthiness, or expressions of blame. But even blaming responses may not be 
µhigh threat¶. Instead, preliminary empirical work by Malle et al (2012) suggests that 
individuals are more likely to see responses as forms of blaming when they are 
thoughtful, calm and delivered without high emotion (in contrast, see the conception 
of blame outlined and critiqued by Pickard 2013, which supposes blame has an 
emotional µsting¶). Finally, some initial work on reactions to blame for implicit racial 
bias has found that blaming responses did not increase implicit biases, and in fact 
significantly increased individuals¶ explicit intentions to take action to address bias. 
This effect on explicit intentions was long lasting, persisting in a 6 month retest, in 
which participants continued to report stronger motivations to tackle discrimination 
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(see Scaife et al ms.).4 In short, no µbacklash effect¶ was observed. This result may 
seem surprising at first. But note that it is less so if worries about blame for implicit 
bias rest on a mistaken paradigm of blaming communications: one which supposes 
that individuals are being told they are bad and wrong. Instead, blame for implicit bias 
might be better modelled ± at least in some cases ± as a communication in which 
individuals are alerted to the fact that they have violated a norm that they already 
(rightly) endorse (see Scaife et al ms. for more discussion). We might expect reactions 
to these different sorts of communication to elicit rather different responses. It seems 
that considerable work is still to be done on understanding how to model different 
sorts of moral response, and on empirically evaluating how they are received and 
reacted to. 
 If responses such as blame are effective in influencing individuals¶ attitudes 
towards avoiding implicit bias, then there may be reason to deploy such responses 
irrespective of whether individuals in fact deserve such responses. But absent desert, 
the justificatory burden for blame is certainly greater. So, much hinges on whether 
agents are in fact blameworthy for implicit bias or implicitly biased actions. This 
depends on how we conceive of the conditions for this kind of responsibility, to which 
we now turn. 
 
2) Folk vs Revisionist conceptions of responsibility 
Many philosophical conceptions of responsibility aim to articulate, perhaps with some 
refinements, the conditions of responsibility embedded within and deployed by folk 
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 Note that these findings address one objection to communicating blame; but the issue of 
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might be reasons (backlash) to withhold blame even if the agent is blameworthy; we can imagine 
scenarios in which one should blame (if the gains are great) even if the agent is not blameworthy. 
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conceptions of responsibility. Whilst there is of course much long standing 
philosophical disagreement over how to articulate and unpack this conception, many 
agree on the centrality of the following notions in determining moral responsibility, in 
the sense of blameworthiness, for attitudes and actions based upon them: awareness or 
knowledge conditions; and control conditions (which authors have spelled out in 
terms of reasons-responsiveness or evidence-sensitivity conditions that have featured 
heavily in the literature (Fischer & Ravizza 2000; Levy 2014, forthcoming)). In a 
paradigm case of wrong-doing for which the agent is morally responsible, the agent¶s 
attitudes are under her control in that they are suitably responsive to reasons and to 
evidence; she is aware of what she is doing and of the consequences of her actions; 
and she is able to ensure her actions reflect her endorsed values. 
 It is clear enough that the discriminatory actions influenced by implicit bias ± 
such as the evaluations and interactions of Professor P ± do not meet this paradigm. 
Professor P¶s implicit biases are not sensitive to her other (evidentially supported) 
attitudes, beliefs and values, but conflict with them; she is unaware that she 
discriminates; and she does so automatically, without the reflective or deliberative 
control we are sometimes able to exercise. This departure from the paradigm cases of 
moral responsibility has lead some authors to claim that individuals are not 
responsible for actions influenced by implicit bias: such actions cannot reflect badly 
on them, nor are they always blameworthy for them (see Saul 2013, above).  
Levy offers extensive arguments for the claim that individuals such as 
Professor P are not blameworthy for implicitly biased actions, because her actions are 
not actions of which she is appropriately consciously aware; 5  nor is she able to 
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folk conception of moral responsibility. Terminologically, it is important to note that Levy is 
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exercise reflective control over them; nor are the attitudes integrated with (or 
responsive to) her endorsed evaluative attitudes (Levy 2012, 2015, ms). Accordingly, 
Levy claims, they cannot be reflective of who the agent is, and so it cannot be 
appropriate to respond with certain burdens (sanction, blame, punishment) (ms.: 4). 
But of course, it is debatable whether the notions of awareness, or control, 
deployed in such arguments are the relevant ones for blameworthiness (see Holroyd 
2012), and some lines of debate have engaged these issues.  
 
a) Awareness 
Consider first the awareness requirement. The idea that we are responsible (in the 
sense of blameworthy for) only for those attitudes or actions that fall within, or are 
guided by, conscious awareness faces sustained critical challenge from Sher (2009). 
Such a condition would implausibly render us exculpated from (inter alia) any 
instance of absent-mindedness, inattention, or forgetting (cf Smith 2005). We should 
instead, Sher suggests, start from the thought that ³when someone acts wrongly or 
foolishly, the question on which his responsibility depends is not whether he is aware 
that his act is wrong or foolish, but rather whether he should be´ (Sher, 2009:20). 
 In the context of implicit bias, various senses of awareness are in circulation 
(taxonomised Holroyd 2014): agents may have (or lack) introspective awareness of 
their implicit biases; individuals may have (or lack) inferential awareness of their 
proneness to implicit biases ± that is, an awareness based on inferences drawn from 
empirical studies to our own propensities. Third, individuals may have (or lack) 
observational awareness ± that is, awareness based on the observation of their own 
                                                                                                                                           
concerned with blameworthiness, even though he frames his question as concerning whether 
biases are ȁȂ to the agent (ms. p.4). 
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behaviours, in one off cases or in patterns of action.6 Relatedly, individuals may be 
aware (or not) of the moral significance of their action (Levy 2014). Combined with 
Sher¶s insight, Holroyd argues that responsibility will depend not on whether 
individuals in fact have or lack any such sense of awareness, but rather on whether we 
should have any of these kinds of awareness; and in the instance in which we do not, 
whether any such failure is culpable. 
 For instance, such a strategy is deployed by Washington & Kelly (2016), who 
argue that agents in certain positions of power or authority ± those on hiring panels, 
say ± should have awareness of their own likely implicit biases. That is, given their 
role responsibilities and the impact of their decisions, they should be aware of the 
relevant research on implicit bias, and be able to make inferences about the ways in 
which their own judgements may be biased ± and, crucially, the steps they may take 
to mitigate this. The issue is then whether such individuals are culpable when they 
lack such awareness. 
 Washington & Kelly take this to support µexternalist¶ conditions on 
responsibility, such that an individual¶s failing to be aware of what she should be may 
or may not be culpable, contingent upon her epistemic environment. In a context in 
which information ± from which inferences can be drawn ± is not readily available, 
the failure of awareness is not (or at least, is less) culpable. But in an epistemic 
environment such as ours, in which such information is - increasingly - more readily 
available, we are culpable for lacking awareness of the information of which we 
should, and can reasonably be expected to be, aware. 
                                                 
6 Note, moreover, that it is a mistake to suppose a failure to report implicit biases (on self-
report measures) is equivalent to lacking awareness in any one of these senses (since there 
may be various reasons for failures of self-report). See Stafford 2014 for discussion. 
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 Holroyd (2014) argues that in fact, we need not demand even this inferential 
awareness; agents may have observational awareness even in epistemic environments 
in which research on implicit bias is not µcommon knowledge¶. This can be gained by 
careful reflection on one¶s own behaviour and its role in sustaining patterns of 
systemic injustice. Whilst the relevant observations may be more easily made when 
information about implicit bias is prevalent, such information is not necessary. 
Indeed, prior to the advent of research on implicit bias, plenty of testimonial evidence 
from individuals targeted by implicit racial biases could have prompted such 
reflections and observations (see Holroyd & Puddifoot forthcoming). And, insofar as 
these observations are blocked by motivated ignorance - avoidance or ignoring 
(perhaps subconsciously) of evidence that serves one¶s goals - or self-deception, or 
excessive weight given to misleading introspective evidence, a failure to have this sort 
of awareness is culpable to some degree. 
 In sum, on the folk conception of responsibility, some awareness conditions 
may be required for individuals to be blameworthy for their wrongful actions. But it is 
far from clear that simply lacking conscious awareness of facts about implicit bias, or 
the fact that one is discriminating, is exculpatory. Rather, we might expect that 
individuals ± at least in some epistemic contexts ± have, and should have, certain 
kinds of awareness about their propensity to harbour and manifest implicit bias.  
 
b) Control 
Contention has also arisen over the kind of control necessary to ground 
blameworthiness for actions influenced by implicit biases. As Saul has argued, 
individuals lack direct control over the activation and influence of implicit bias. We 
can¶t simply will that biases don¶t affect us, and make it so. Indeed, studies have 
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indicated that trying to suppress implicit bias has a rebound effect (Follenfant & Ric 
2010). 
 However, many aspects of our cognition and action for which we are held 
responsible are not under our direct control. This suggests that other forms of control 
are relevant to moral responsibility. Two questions then arise: what forms of control 
are necessary for moral responsibility? And do we have these form of control with 
respect to implicitly biased actions? 
 Levy (2014, 2015) has argued that agent¶s attitudes must be under a certain 
kind of rational control ± they must be inferentially sensitive to, and integrate with, 
the other evidence-sensitive attitudes of the agent. Drawing on evidence that implicit 
attitudes are not inferentially sensitive in the appropriate way, he argues that actions 
influenced by implicit biases cannot be reflective of the agent in a way that renders 
her liable to blame (Levy 2015 pp.812-816). Such implicit attitudes cannot, Levy 
argues, be properly integrated into the agent. 
 It is worth noting, however, that any such lack of inferential sensitivity does 
not necessitate a lack of integration. Implicit biases may accord with and thereby 
reflect the agent¶s values, even if not under rational control (Holroyd 2016). The 
paradigm case of this would be an explicit racist who nonetheless has implicit 
cognitions and automatic responses, which contribute to (and function in the service 
of) his morally repugnant goals. 
 In any case, rational control may not be necessary for moral responsibility: 
other sorts of control may suffice in order for agents to meet any control conditions 
for moral evaluation. For example, Snow (2006) identifies a sort of µintervention 
control¶ that agents may exercise over automatic processes (in the context of 
discussing automaticity, rather than implicit biases per se ± see Holroyd & Kelly 
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(2016) for discussion of intervention control in the context of implicit biases). Whilst 
the processes themselves are not rationally guided, but are automatized and 
habituated, agents may intervene to halt or redirect these processes. Such control may 
be possible in the case of implicit biases. For example when on a hiring panel, 
Professor P may intervene to halt the automatic influence of implicit biases, by, say, 
referring to a checklist of previously agreed upon criteria, as a strategy to try to 
overcome any tendency to bias (cf WISELI 2012, p.6). 
 Other forms of indirect control may also be deployed, such as re-training or 
conditioning one¶s own cognitions via techniques such as µimplementation 
intentions¶. This technique involves conditioning certain counter-stereotypical 
automatic thoughts in response to environmental cues: for example, automatizing the 
thought µsafe¶, as prompted by any black person, in order to try to overcome 
associations between blackness and danger or hostility (Stewart & Payne 2008). 
Agents may add to these cognitive props environmental props also ± reshaping their 
social environment in a way that impacts on their cognitions in desirable ways. For 
example, some studies have suggested that the presence of pictures depicting counter-
stereotypical exemplars reduces negative biases (Blair 2002). 
 These modes of indirect control ± manipulating one¶s environment or one¶s 
cognitions in order to secure desirable patterns of thought and behaviour ± have been 
identified by Holroyd & Kelly (2016) as forms of µecological control¶. They argue 
that this kind of control is in fact mundane, oft-deployed (e.g. consider organising 
one¶s office to ward off procrastinatory tendencies), and sufficient for meeting control 
conditions for moral responsibility.  
 Whilst the kinds of ecological control so far outlined involve intentionally 
deploying strategies to exert control, Holroyd & Kelly argue that this is not necessary. 
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One form of ecological control outlined is that of unintentional indirect control: an 
example of this is the sort of control demonstrated by participants in Moskowitz & 
Li¶s 2011 studies, whereby agents with strong egalitarian commitments appeared to 
be better able to block the activation of implicit biases. This was not explicitly 
intended by those agents, but seemed to be an automatic function of their strongly 
held egalitarian commitments. Since agents who lacked such commitments were less 
effective at blocking the activation of implicit stereotypes, Holroyd & Kelly argue, it 
is to the agent¶s credit and attributable to her, when her values better enable the 
pursuit of her goals.  
 Whether agents who are influenced by implicit biases meet control conditions 
for moral responsibility, then, will depend on what notion of control one teases out of 
the folk conception, how defensible this notion of control is,  and the extent to which 
it is exercised with respect to implicit biases. Note that in teasing out these notions, 
there is some refinement of the ideas found in the folk conception: in the articulation 
of the idea of µecological control¶ for example. But authors proposing these notions 
take such ideas to be latent in, or extensions of, the folk concept of moral 
responsibility. This contrasts with the strategies deployed by theorists who are 
explicitly revisionist about moral responsibility. 
 
c) Revisionism 
Some authors have suggested that thinking about blameworthiness for implicit biases 
should motivate revisions to this understanding of the concept of moral responsibility, 
whereby it is acknowledged explicitly that such revisions involve a departure from 
seemingly intuitive thought about what it is for attitudes and actions to reflect on us, 
and render us liable to blame. 
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 Two authors who propose such revisions are Glasgow (2016) and Faucher 
(2016). Each is motivated by the idea that we are morally responsible for actions 
influenced by implicit biases ± but that this can only be adequately captured by 
revising our analyses of moral responsibility. For example, Glasgow suggests that 
whilst common sense suggests that the conditions for moral responsibility are 
invariant ± they remain constant across agents and contexts ± his reflections on 
implicit bias lead to the revisionary conclusion that they are variant. In particular, the 
conditions vary depending on the content of the attitude held and the action performed 
on the basis of it (2016: 48) (later, Glasgow suggests that the content is a proxy for 
the kind or degree of harm caused (2016: 56)). On this view, the content of the 
attitude determines whether an agent¶s alienation from her attitude (or action 
performed on that basis) suffices to exculpate. In the case of Frankfurt¶s alienated 
drug-user, alienation seems to suffice. But in cases where the attitude involves a 
relational harm ± the attitudes that drive infidelity, or prejudicial attitudes involved in 
implicit biases ± the fact that the agent is alienated from her attitude does not serve to 
exculpate.  
 Faucher (2016) also argues for a revisionary form of variantism about moral 
responsibility. On his view, the dimension of variation concerns the conditions that 
are applied depending on one¶s position in relation to the harm. If one is ± or has been 
± a victim of discrimination, the conditions one deploys in evaluating moral 
responsibility will not make reference to explicit or conscious intentions, he argues. 
Harm has been perpetrated and it matters not, from this point of view, whether it was 
consciously intended. However, from the point of view of perpetrators, conscious 
intention does matter.  
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 One might think that this difference rests on mistake or disingenuousness on 
the part of the perpetrators. But if it is genuine and withstands reflective scrutiny, then 
our conditions for moral responsibility may turn out to be variant ± and an invariantist 
articulation of the concept of moral responsibility should be revised accordingly.  
 Faucher also suggests other revisions; first, to the notion of control necessary 
for responsibility. As discussed above, forms of indirect control (Faucher calls those 
which involve retraining of one¶s cognitions a kind of µbottom-up¶ control) may be 
sufficient for moral responsibility. And notions of responsibility that make reference 
to the µreal self¶ - the part of the self that reveals where the agent stands ± may have to 
account for the agent¶s real self as including some unendorsed implicit attitudes, as 
well as her endorsed explicit attitudes.  
 An explicitly revisionist model of responsibility has been developed and 
defended by Manuel Vargas in recent years (2005, 2009, 2013). His recent work has 
applied this model to implicit biases. Vargas (2017) sees responsibility judgements as 
part of a practice that can be justified if it serves certain forward-looking goals of 
cultivating moral agency. On this view, to be a responsible agent is to stand in certain 
social relations (rather than to meet certain metaphysical conditions). Thus construed, 
it is crucial that the agent¶s context supports moral agency in relation to a certain set 
of considerations. Vargas worries that our current environment (the µmoral ecology¶) 
does not yet provide the right sort of support. We are perhaps not yet suitably 
cognisant of, or sensitive to considerations of implicit bias, to make it appropriate ± or 
fruitful ± to hold each other responsible or liable to blame, on his view. But, as our 
moral ecology evolves, it may be appropriate to do so. This line of argument has 
resonance with Washington & Kelly¶s (2016) externalist conditions for moral 
responsibility, whereby what can reasonably be expected of agents may shift as 
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epistemic environments change. Note also that this view about the current impropriety 
of blame shares much with the concerns about the defensiveness and hostility that 
such appraisive responses may invoke. Yet, as we have seen, it is not at all clear that 
we do find these responses ± it may instead be that these interpersonal interactions of 
blame are part of the tools that shape the moral ecology and increase sensitivity to, 
and motivation to combat, implicit biases (Holroyd 2012, Scaife et al ms.). 
 These moral responses are premised chiefly on the idea that individuals may 
be held responsible for implicit biases. But this is not the only option. 
 
3) Individual, institutional and collective responsibility 
So far, the focus has been on holding individuals morally responsible for particular 
discriminatory actions or judgements made under the influence of implicit bias. But as 
noted at the outset, the problem is not simply one of particular discriminatory 
behaviours, but also of their role in sustaining patterns of marginalisation, exclusion, 
and hierarchy. Insofar as these social structures are collectively caused, sustained, and 
stand in need of collective remedy, it appears that an approach that requires collective 
responsibility is also needed.  
 Of course, questions remain about who is collectively responsible for what, in 
both the backward-looking (evaluation of character; or identification of who is to 
blame) and forward-looking (who bears remedial costs) senses. One might maintain 
that all of us are to blame for, or have a role in remedying, the harms that result from 
implicit biases. Indeed, as Jacobson has noted (2016, 174), agents need not have done 
anything particularly wrong in order to have been complicit in sustaining patterns of 
exclusion. This complicity may justify being held accountable for remedying the 
harms. Or one might maintain that responsibility and blameworthiness falls 
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collectively, but proportionally, on those groups who have greater role in perpetrating 
harm (cf. Washington & Kelly¶s remarks about people in µgatekeeper¶ positions 
having greater responsibilities). Likewise, in terms of forward-looking responsibility, 
Sie and Van Voorst Vader-Bours suggest that  µit seems reasonable to expect those in 
positions of power to take more responsibility for change¶ (2016: 107). Moreover, if it 
is right that remedying implicit biases is most effectively done by making broader 
structural changes (Saul 2013b, Haslanger 2015, Anderson 2012), then certainly 
institutional and collective action will be needed to enact this. But as Madva has 
persuasively argued (2016b) attention to individual or collective endeavours should 
not be seen as competing; rather, the complex interplay between individual and more 
collective or structural interventions needs to be recognised. For example, 
institutional change requires individual buy-in and motivation to instigate change. We 
close with an example of how both institutional and individual responsibility need to 
have a role in practical efforts to remedy implicit bias.  
 Many institutions now offer µimplicit bias training¶ ± seminars that aim to 
make individuals within an institution aware of the possibility of implicit biases 
influencing their behaviour, and of remedies that could be undertaken to combat this. 
One model for thinking about these training sessions is in terms of individual 
responsibility: individuals are made aware of certain problematic facts (their 
propensity for bias), and are given certain tools that they can apply to their cognitions, 
or to their workplace procedures, in order to try to prevent their biases from having a 
role. This training devolves (forward-looking) responsibility to individuals for 
remedying bias.  
However, this model may be flawed, both in terms of efficacy and theoretical 
warrant. First, if the emphasis is on individual de-biasing, this requires that 
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individuals accept and acknowledge that they themselves have implicit bias. Since 
cognitive biases include objectivity bias (the propensity to believe that one is more 
objective than one¶s counterparts (Pronin et al 2004; Rachlinski et al 2009)), there are 
significant obstacles to securing this acceptance. Moreover, we need not (and often 
cannot) pinpoint exactly whom is biased and on what occasions; it suffices to 
motivate institutional change to know that many individuals will, on many occasions, 
display certain kinds of biases. Instead, the emphasis should be on the fact that bias is 
pervasive, and as individuals within institutions we should seek procedures that make 
those institutions robust against the influence of implicit bias. Second, this model may 
seem to imply that the primary focus of addressing implicit biases is to de-bias 
individuals. If this is the aim, then devolving responsibility to individuals is a flawed 
strategy: since there exist few studies that show the long term efficacy of changes to 
implicit biases (Lai et al 2014, though cf. Madva ms.). The point is not that 
individuals should not try to de-bias (see Madva ms. for the claim that such efforts, 
are, in the grand scheme of things, rather small), nor that individual attitude change is 
not relevant at all ± but that such efforts should not be independent of institutional 
change ± which itself requires that individuals are motivated to institute and sustain 
those changes. Moreover, and fundamentally, this model risks obscuring the fact that 
individual de-biasing is only part of, and perhaps instrumental to, the central goal, 
which is to address patterns of discriminatory outcome. This may be secured by 
means other than individual de-biasing.  
The overall point, then, is that in recognising the role that individuals and 
institutions must play, we see that institutional responsibility must reach further than 
simply providing implicit bias training, on the assumption that this devolves 
responsibility to individuals for dealing with discrimination. Rather, the responsibility 
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is with (individuals within) institutions to take sustained measures to address 
whatever mechanisms are producing discriminatory outcomes. Implicit bias training 
may be a part of those measures, but institutional change must extend well beyond 
this. 
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